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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Section 78-2a-(3)(2)(h) U.C.A. (1953), as
amended governing appeals transferred from the Supreme Court to the Court of Appeals.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

Did Trial Court Exceed or Abuse Its Discretion In Dismissing the
Action?

Standard of review:

The Court of Appeals, in deciding whether a dismissal

of the action was appropriate, can review whether the Trial Court erred in applying the
relevant law, and can reach the merits of the underlying judgment from which relief was
sought to determine whether the District Court abused it's discretion.
Appeal Preservation:

Appellant raised this issue in Motion to Set Aside (R.

474-475)
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II.

Did Trial Court Exceed or Abuse Its Discretion In Denying the Motion
To Set Aside?

Standard of Review:

The Court of Appeals reviews the Trail Court's

decision to deny a Motion to Dismiss under an abuse of discretion standard. Further, the
Court of Appeals will disturb a Trial Court's ruling if there has been an error in regard to
the law.
Appeal Preservation:

Appellant raised this issue in Motion to Set Aside. (R.

474-475)
III.

Did Trial Court Err or Abuse Its Discretion In Denying the Motion For
A New Trial?

Standard of Review:

The Court of Appeals reviews the denial of a Motion

for a New Trial under an abuse of discretion standard. Further, the Court of Appeals will
disturb a Trial Court's ruling if there has been an error in regard to the law.
Appeal Preservation:

Appellant raised this issue in Motion for a New Trial.

(R. 594-595)
IV.

Did Trial Court Err or Abuse Its Discretion in Awarding Attorney's
Fees?

Standard of Review:

The Court of Appeals reviews the Trial Court's

decision to award attorney's fees as a question of law that is reviewed for correctness and
under an abuse of discretion standard as to the amount awarded.

Appeal Preservation:

Appellant raised this issue in Objection to Attorney's

Fees; Motion to Set Aside and in Motion for a New Trial (R. 474-475 & 594-595)
STATUES AND RULES
U.C.A. 78-27-56(1)
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a
prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to the action
was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith . . . .

Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered
Evidence; Fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court
may in the furtherance ofjustice relieve a part or his legal representative from
a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse
party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released,
or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have
prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time
and for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not more than 3 months after the judgment,
order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this Subdivision
(b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This
rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to
relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment
for fraud upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a
judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent
action.

6

Rule 59(a)(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be
granted to all or any of the parties and one all or part of the issues, for any of
the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new
judgment:

(7) Error in law
Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
(b) Involuntary Dismissal; For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to
comply with these rules or any order of court, a Defendant may move for
dismissal of an action or of any claim against him . . . .
Utah Supreme Court Rules of Professional Practice, Chapter 23, Standards of
Professionalism and Civility
Preamble. A lawyer's conduct should be characterized at all times by
personal courtesy and professional integrity in the fullest sense of those terms.
In fulfilling a duty to represent a client vigorously as lawyers, we must be
mindful of our obligations to the administration of justice, which is a truthseeking process designed to resolve human and societal problems in a rational,
peaceful, and efficient manner. We must remain committed to the rule of law
as the foundation for a just and peaceful society.

We expect judges and lawyers will make mutual and firm commitments
to these standards.
Paragraph 14.
Lawyers shall advise their clients that they reserve the
right to determine whether to grant accommodations to other counsel in all
7

matters not directly affecting the merits of the cause or prejudicing the client's
rights, such as extensions of time, continuances, adjournments, and admissions
of facts.
Paragraph 15.
If other counsel requires a scheduling change, lawyers
shall cooperate in making any reasonable adjustments.

STATEMENT OF CASE
Nature of the Case:

The Plaintiff filed an action against the Defendants alleging

theft and conversion of Plaintiff s personal property with damages exceeding
$300,000.00. A trial was scheduled for October 15-17, 2007 and then continued to
November 5-7, 2008. Plaintiff and his counsel believed the trial started on November 6,
2007 and did not appear on November 5, 2007. The trial Court dismissed the action with
prejudice and granted attorneys fees.
Course of Proceedings:

The Plaintiffs filed their complaint on March 3, 2006. (R. 1-

13). The Court signed an Amended Attorney Planning Meeting Report and Scheduling
Order on May 31, 2006. (R. 49-52). Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment
(R. 173-175) on January 10, 2007, which was denied by the Court on June 26, 2007. (R.
338-344). After all time periods had expired under said Scheduling Order, the Court
scheduled a jury trial for October 15-17, 2007. Due to a conflict with the Utah Senior
Games wherein Plaintiffs counsel was a participant, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Continue
the Trial on June 27, 2007. (R. 345-346).
8

On August 20, 2007 a hearing was held with the Court and Plaintiffs Motion to
Continue was granted without objection and a jury trial was scheduled on the Court's
docket sheet (Addendum A) for November 5, 6 & 8, 2007 and then corrected on the
docket sheet to November 5, 6 &7, 2007. No written notices as to the dates of the trial
were sent by either the Court or any counsel.
The three-day trial began on Monday, November 5, 2007, but neither the Plaintiff
nor his counsel were present and the Court dismissed the action with prejudice and
awarded attorneys fees. (T. 3-4). An Order of dismissal was signed November 7, 2007;
(R. 460-471) Plaintiff filed on November 8, 2008 a Motion to Set Aside the Order of
Dismissal and Memorandum in support thereof (R. 474-475) and Objections to proposed
orders and attorneys fees. (R. 512-513). Plaintiff also filed Objections to S&B's
attorney's fees on November 15, 2007. (R. 568-569). On January 8, 2008 the Court
denied Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside and Objections to attorney's fees and signed the
two judgments for attorney's fees. (R. 582-589). Plaintiff then filed a Motion for a New
Trial and Memorandum in support thereof on January 11, 2008 (R. 594-615) which was
denied on the 26th of February, 2008. Plaintiff filed his appeal on February 29th, 2008.

Disposition Below:

The Trial Court dismissed the action with prejudice and

entered two judgments for attorney's fees that greatly exceeded the amounts awarded at

Q

the trial on November 5, 2008. The Trial Court made no findings and further denied the
Motion to Set Aside and the Motion for a New Trial.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. The Plaintiffs filed an action against the Defendants for theft and conversion of
over $300,000.00 worth of personal property belonging to the Plaintiffs. After the
completion of all discovery and applicable cut-off dates the matter was ready for trial. (R.
1-13).
2. On the 18th day of June, 2007, a Scheduling Conference was held before the
Court wherein a Jury Trial was scheduled for October 15, 16 and 17, 2007. (R. 336-337).
3. On the 27th day of June, 2007, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Continue the Trial due
to a conflict of Plaintiff s counsel participating in the Utah Senior Games. (R.345-346).
4. The Motion to Continue was heard on the 20th day of August, 2007, and at said
hearing the Court suggested alternative dates for the trial. At said hearing Randy Ludlow,
counsel for the Defendants, S & B Storage, indicated he had a conflict with November 5,
6 and 7 since he was going with his wife to Chicago on the 4 ,5 and 6 of November,
2007. However, Mr. Ludlow withdrew his objection. Thereafter, a discussion was held
between the Court and the attorneys in regard to settling the case and the potential
litigation against the insurance company. The hearing concluded without any specific
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statements made as to the exact dates of the trial although, based upon Mr Ludlow's
withdrawal of his objection to the dates of November 5, 6 and 7, 2007, it was apparently
assumed by the Court and the attorneys that the trial was rescheduled for November 5, 6
and 7, 2007. (R. 375).
5. A Minute Entry was entered on the docket on the 20th of August, 2007
scheduling a Jury Trial for November 5th, November 7th and November 8th. 2007. Said
Minute Entry was corrected on said date and an entry was made that the Jury Trial was
scheduled for November 5th, 6th and 7th, 2007. (Addendum A).
6. Neither the Court nor any of the attorneys prepared a Notice of the Trial, no
order was prepared or served in regard to the new trial date, nor was a notice served on
any of the parties through their attorneys as to the new trial date.
7. Plaintiffs counsel was under the impression that the Trial was scheduled for
November 6th, 7th and 8th, 2007 because he already had a different trial scheduled for the
5th of November, 2007 written in his calendar. He wrote the dates of November 6, 7 & 8,
2007 on his calendar for the trial in the above matter. Plaintiffs counsel's calendar is
attached as Exhibit "B" to his affidavit. (Addendum B). Immediately after the hearing
held on the 20th of August 2007, Plaintiffs counsel dictated a letter, which was sent to his
client, Lonnie Paulos, on the 22nd of August 2007 indicating that the trial was scheduled
for November 6th, 7th, and 8th, 2007. A copy of the letter is attached as Exhibit "H" to his
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affidavit. (Addendum B).
8. Plaintiffs counsel's trial scheduled for Monday, November 5, 2007, was before
the Honorable Thomas Kay in the Second Judicial District Court in Bountiful, Utah, and a
copy of that Notice of Trial was attached as Exhibit "C" to his affidavit. (Addendum B).
9. Even though discovery had been closed for some time, Plaintiffs counsel
accommodated the request of Defendant, All My Sons', to conduct two additional
depositions that were held in August and September 2007. (R. 347-349, 366-368). In the
last part of October 2007, counsel for the Defendant, All My Sons, requested another
accommodation in regard to one of its witnesses, an investigating police officer, who
could not attend the trial. Again, Plaintiffs counsel agreed to allow said witness'
deposition to be admitted at the trial. Conversely, when Plaintiffs counsel requested a
similar accommodation in regard to the potential non-appearance at trial of one of
Plaintiffs witnesses, Rhonda Jones, Defendants' counsel refused. On the 24th of October,
2007, Plaintiffs counsel, on behalf of the Plaintiff, filed a Motion to Admit the
Deposition of Rhonda Jones along with a Memorandum in Support Thereof, the Affidavit
of Richard S. Nemelka, and a proposed Order. (R. 411-418). All of said pleadings
indicated that the trial was scheduled for November 6th through 8th of 2007 and were
mailed to the attorneys for both Defendants.
10. On the 29th of October 2007, the Court signed an Order (R. 417-418) to admit
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the Deposition of Rhonda Jones and said Order specifically stated, in paragraph 1, "That
the deposition of Rhonda Jones on April 30, 2007, shall be admitted into evidence to be
used during the trial scheduledfor November 6-8, 2007, in the above-entitled matter "
(Addendum C)(emphasis added).
11. Plaintiffs counsel prepared Subpoenas and served the same upon witnesses all
indicating that the trial was scheduled to begin on the 6th of November 2007. A copy of
one Subpoena was attached as Exhibit "F" to his affidavit. (Addendum B)
12. Stephen D. Spencer, counsel for the Defendant, All My Sons Moving and
Storage, also filed various Subpoenas indicating that the trial was scheduled for
November 6 and 7 of 2007. Said pleadings are attached as Exhibit "G" to the above
referenced affidavit. (R. 497-498 and Addendum B).
13. That on or about the 2nd of November 2007, Plaintiffs counsel had a
conversation with Stephen D. Spencer, attorney for the Defendant, All My Sons Moving
and Storage, where it was discussed whether or not the trial was a Jury Trial or a Bench
Trial. Plaintiffs counsel specifically stated to Mr. Spencer that he believed it was a
Bench Trial and that the Trial was to begin on Tuesday, the 6 of November 2007. Mr.
Spencer indicated that he thought the Trial was scheduled for Monday, the 5th of
November, 2007; however, Plaintiffs counsel specifically stated to Mr. Spencer that was
inaccurate and, in fact, the Trial was scheduled to begin on Tuesday, the 6 of November,

2007 and would not have been scheduled on the 5 of November, 2007 for the reason that
Plaintiffs counsel had to be in attendance at another trial before Judge Kay in the Second
District Court which began at 8:30 a.m. on the 5th of November, 2007. (R. 493-494 and
Addendum B). Plaintiffs counsel did not review Mr. Spencer's trial brief and no one
from his office advised him that Mr. Spencer had called saying the trial was on the 5th.
14. Later, on the 2nd of November 2007, in response to the conversation with Mr.
Spencer, Plaintiffs counsel had a conversation with Lyn MacLeod, Judge Henroid's
Clerk. The conversation concerned whether the Trial was a jury or bench trial, wherein it
was agreed that the Trial was a Bench Trial since no request had ever been made for a
jury trial and no fee had been paid. Apparently, the Court had made a mistake in
scheduling a jury trial. At the beginning of said conversation between Plaintiffs counsel
and Lyn MacLeod, Plaintiffs counsel indicated that he was calling in regard to the Paulos
Trial that was scheduled for next Tuesday (November 6, 2007) and that there was a
question as to whether or not the trial was a Jury Trial or a Bench Trial. Lyn MacLeod
did not correct Plaintiffs counsel as to whether or not the trial was to begin on Tuesday,
the 6th of November and Plaintiffs counsel continued to believe that the trial was
scheduled to begin on the 6th of November, 2007. (R. 476-498 and Addendum B).
15. Plaintiffs counsel, on or about the 30 of October 2007, was advised that
Judge Henroid has signed the Order to admit the Deposition of Rhonda Jones that, again,
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indicated that the trial was scheduled for November 6-8, 2007. This infonnation was
conveyed to Plaintiff on said date. A copy of the proposed Order to admit was sent to the
Plaintiff on the 23rd of October 2007 along with the Motion and affidavit of his counsel.
Plaintiff, Lonnie Paulos relied upon the Order of the Court dated October 29, 2008, the
Motion and Affidavit referred to above, and the correspondence and communications he
received from his attorney in believing that the trial would start on November 6, 2007 and
not on the 5th. (Affidavit of Lonnie Paulos R. 521-523).
16. The Plaintiff, Lonnie Paulos, was always of the understanding that the trial
was scheduled to begin on the 6th of November 2007 and, in fact, had re-arranged his
work schedule so that he could be in Utah on the evening of November 5, 2007. Mr.
Paulos had scheduled his airline travel to leave Houston, Texas, in the afternoon of
November 5, 2007. He was on his way to the airport when Plaintiffs counsel contacted
him at approximately 12:30 p.m. on the 5th of November 2007, and indicated to Mr.
Paulos that the Court had dismissed the action due to their non-appearance that morning
and there would not be a Trial on the 6th and 7th. Based thereon, Mr. Paulos did not use
his purchased ticket to fly to Salt Lake. (R.521-523).
17. Plaintiffs counsel had also scheduled all of Plaintiffs' witnesses to appear on
Tuesday, the 6th of November 2007. (Addendum B).
18. Plaintiffs counsel's office also arranged for an interpreter to be present on
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Tuesday, the 6 of November 2007, for one of Plaintiffs' witnesses. Plaintiffs counsel's
office also arranged to have Plaintiffs counsel's wife to be present on the 6 of
November 2007 to read the deposition of Ronda Jones. (Affidavit of Jayne Nemelka R.
524-526).
19. Plaintiffs counsel had numerous conversations with his client, Lonnie Paulos,
and witnesses in preparation for the trial and advised all witnesses that the trial was
scheduled to begin on the 6th of November 2007. (Addendum B).
20. In August 2007 and the few months prior to the trial in November 2007,
Plaintiffs counsel had other problems in regard to his short-term memory. His mistake in
assuming on the 20th of August 2007, that the trial was scheduled for November 6th, 7th
and 8th' 2007 was an honest mistake. Plaintiffs counsel did not intentionally write down
the wrong dates on his calendar or intentionally not appear at the trial on the 5th of
November 2007 since he was involved in another trial on said date and time. (Addendum
B).
22. The Plaintiff, Lonnie Paulos received a letter dated August 22, 2007 from his
counsel indicating the trial was scheduled for November 6, 7 & 8, 2007. During the time
period from August 20, 2007 through November 5, 2007, Plaintiff had numerous
conversations with his counsel and witnesses and it was always understood that the trial
would begin on November 6, 2007. (R.521-523).
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23. Although counsel for both Defendants knew around October 24, 2007 that
Plaintiff and Plaintiffs counsel believed that the trial was starting on November 6, 2007,
neither counsel contacted Plaintiffs counsel nor the Court in regard to the known
mistake. Further, the Court also knew on October 29th, 2007 when it signed the Order
that Plaintiff and Plaintiffs counsel believed the trial was November 6-8, 2007, but the
Court also did not inform Plaintiffs counsel of his apparent mistake. Then at the trial on
November 5, 2007, knowing that Plaintiffs counsel was involved in another trial, and
that he was not going to be at the trial, both counsel for the Defendants requested that the
Court dismiss the action with prejudice and award them attorney's fees, which the Court
did.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

The Trial Court Abused or Exceeded Its Discretion In Dismissing the
Action.

The Plaintiff respectfully argues that the Trial Court abused its discretion in
dismissing the action with prejudice when a more reasonable option would have been to
start the trial the next day and assess attorney's fees for the appearances on the 5 of
November 2007.
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II.

The Trial Court Abused or Exceeded Its Discretion In Failing to Grant
the Motion to Set Aside.

The Plaintiff met all of the requirements of Rule 60(b)(1) to show an honest
mistake had been made justifying setting aside the Order of dismissal and award of
attorney's fees. Further, under Rule 60(b)(6) the fact that counsel for both Defendants'
knew that Plaintiffs counsel had made a mistake as to the correct trial date and failed to
inform the court or Plaintiffs counsel constitutes another reason justifying relief from the
Order of dismissal and award of fees. The Motion to Set Aside should have been
granted.
III.

The Trial Court Erred or Abused Its Discretion in Failing to Grant the
Motion for a New Trial.

The Trial Court erred in denying the Motion for a New Trial when there were
irregularities in the proceedings and scheduling of the trial. Further, it was an abuse of
discretion to deny said Motion when the Court knew that a mistake had been made prior
to the trial and that counsel for the Plaintiff was in another trial and that there were still
two days left calendared for the trial which would not have prevented the Plaintiff from
having a trial.
IV.

The Trial Court Erred and Abused Its Discretion in Awarding
Defendants All of Their Attorney's Fees.

18

The Trial Court erred when it awarded the Defendants all of their attorneys' fees
upon granting the dismissal, when the Defendants would not have been entitled to any
attorneys' fees under U.C.A. 78-27-56 had they prevailed at the trial. The trial court erred
when it made no findings as to why it awarded all of Defendants' attorney's fees. At the
time of trial, the Defendants only requested fees for their attorney's preparation and
appearances at the trial. Further, the trial could have been held the next two days to
eliminate the loss of preparation. Lastly, the trial court found that the action was not
without merit.
ARGUMENT
I.

The Trial Court Abused or Exceeded Its Discretion in Dismissing the
Action.

In deciding whether dismissal of the action was appropriate, the above Court can
review whether trial court erred in applying relevant law, and can reach merits to
determine whether trial court abused its discretion. Searle v. Searle, 2001 UT App 367,
^[13. Although the motion to dismiss made by Defendants' counsel on the day of trial was
not noted as such, it most likely was a motion for involuntary dismissal under Rule 41(b).
Plaintiff does not dispute the trial court's discretion under said rule to dismiss an action
with prejudice for failure to prosecute. However, when there is a reasonable and
justifiable excuse for not being present at the trial, then the trial court's discretion "must
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be balanced against the priority of affording disputants an opportunity to be heard and to
do justice between them." Maxfield v. Rushton, 779 P.2d 237, 239 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Plaintiff further acknowledges that it is his burden to offer "a reasonable excuse for his
lack of diligence" in not being present at the first day of trial. Meadow Fresh Farms v.
Utah State Univ., 813 P.2d 1216, 1218 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
One issue then is whether the Plaintiff had a reasonable and justifiable excuse for
not being present on the 5 of November 2007. The following are Plaintiffs reasonable
excuses for not being present on the first day of trial:
1. The Plaintiff received the letter dated August 22, 207 from his counsel
indicating that the trial was scheduled for November 6-8, 2007.
2. From August 20, 2007 through November 5, 2007 Plaintiff had numerous
conversations with his counsel and witnesses in preparation for trial where it was
indicated that the first day of trial was November 6th, 2007.
3. Plaintiff rearranged his work and interview schedules so he could be present at
the trial on the 6th of November 2007, and purchased his plane tickets to arrive in the
afternoon of November 5th, 2007. Otherwise, Plaintiff would have made traveling
arrangements for the 4th of November 2007 rather than the 5th of November 2007 to
accommodate for the actual trial date.
4. Plaintiff never received any notice from the Court or other counsel through his
th

counsel that the trial was to start on November 5 , 2007.
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5. On about October 23, 2007 Plaintiff received the Motion to Admit Rhonda
Jones' deposition, the Affidavit of his counsel, and the proposed Order admitting the
aforesaid deposition, all of which indicated the trial was November 6-8, 2007.
6. On October 30, 2007, Plaintiff was advised that the Court signed the Order
admitting Rhonda Jones' deposition and relied upon the language therein which indicated
the trial was November 6-8, 2007.
7. Plaintiff was prepared to testify on the 6th of November 2007 and had advised
his witnesses to be present on said date. The only reason that he and his witnesses were
not present on the 6th of November 2007 was due to the Court dismissing the action on
the 5th of November 2007.
8. Plaintiff had received copies of Subpoenas served by both the Defendant and
by his counsel that indicated the trial was starting on the 6th of November 2007.
9. Plaintiff knew that his counsel had another trial in Bountiful, Utah on Monday,
the 5th of November 2007.
10. Had the Plaintiff known that the trial started on the 5th of November 2007, he
and his witnesses would have been present at the trial on the 5 of November 2007.
The Plaintiff was very diligent in reviewing the pleadings, correspondence and
communications that he received in determining that the trial started on the 6th of
November 2007. There really wasn't anything else he could have done to discover the
mistake that had been made and he had no control over what his counsel, the Defendants'
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counsel, or trial court did or did not do and was therefore prevented from appearing on
the 5th of November, 2007 by circumstances over which he had no control. He was
entitled to rely upon the October 29, 2007 Order signed by the trial court that specifically
indicated that the trial would start on the 6th.
Plaintiffs counsel's mistake, which the trial court found was an honest mistake
and not intentional, (R. 643) should not have been the basis to dismiss the action with
prejudice when there was a more reasonable, just, and fair solution. There were three
days scheduled for the trial and that amount of time had already been reduced by
Plaintiffs counsel accommodating Defendant, All My Sons' counsel's request to enter
the deposition of a Murray police officer since he could not be present at the trial. The
trial time was further reduced by the trial court's Order of October 29, 2007 allowing
Rhonda Jones' deposition to be admitted since she would not be present. Therefore,
counsel for the Defendants could have requested that the trial court start the trial on the
6th since they knew of Plaintiff s counsel's mistake since October, 23rd, 2007. However,
it would have been appropriate to award attorney's fees for their appearance on the 5 .
This would not have prejudiced the Defendants except for the one-day delay.
In Rohan v. Boseman, 2000 UT App 109, |28, the above court considered the
following factors in determining whether the trial court exceeded it's discretion in
dismissing an action with prejudice when the plaintiff was not ready to proceed with the
trial on the first day of trial:
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(1) The conduct of both parties; (2) the opportunity each party has had to
move the case forward; (3) what each of the parties has done to move the
case forward; (4) what difficulty or prejudice may have been caused to the
other side; and (5) most important, whether injustice may result from the
dismissal.
There is no dispute regarding the conduct of parties, the Plaintiff and the
Defendants. In light of this, the first factor in Rohan , "the conduct of both parties"
would also include their counsel. Individually, they all relied upon their counsel and the
trial court's directives. There is also no dispute that Plaintiffs counsel had a "senior
moment" and made a mistake in calendaring. However, Plaintiff respectfully submits that
the conduct of both counsel for the Defendants contributed to the confusion as to the trial
dates. Both counsel for the Defendants knew as of October 23, 2007 that Plaintiff and his
counsel honestly believed that the trial was scheduled for November 6-8, 2007, and yet
did nothing to bring that mistake to the trial court's attention or to Plaintiffs counsel's
attention. It is true that Stephen Spencer, counsel for Defendant, All My Sons, had a
conversation on the 2nd of November 2007 with Plaintiffs counsel as to whether the trial
was a jury or bench trial. However, in response to Mr. Spencer's belief that the trial
started on the 5 , Plaintiffs counsel specifically stated to Mr. Spencer that
Mr. Spencer was inaccurate and , in fact, the trial was scheduled to begin on
Tuesday, the 6th and would not have been scheduled on the 5th for the
reason that counsel for the Plaintiff had to be in attendance at another trial
before Judge Kay in the Second District Court which began at 8:30 am on
the 5th of November, 2007.
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(Affidavit of Richard S. Nemelka R. 476-498). On the same day the conversation took
place with Mr. Spencer, counsel for the Plaintiff contacted the court to verify that it was a
bench trial starting on the 6 . Plaintiffs counsel stated to Judge Henroid's clerk, "that he
was calling in regard to the Paulos trial that was scheduled for next Tuesday (November
6th, 2007) and that there was a question as to whether or not the trial was a jury trial or a
bench trial." The judge's clerk acknowledged that it was a bench trial, but did not
disagree with or correct Plaintiffs counsel's statement that the trial was scheduled to start
on the 6 . Therefore, it was reasonable for Plaintiffs counsel to continue to believe that
the trial was scheduled to start on the 6th and not the 5th as Mr. Spencer believed. It was
Friday afternoon and Plaintiffs counsel was preparing for the other trial scheduled for the
5th and did not review the trial brief of Mr. Spencer or notice that it stated the trial started
on the 5 . Further, no one in his office advised him that Mr. Spencer had called saying
the trial was on the 5 . He had reviewed the signed October 29, 2007 Order which
indicated the trial started on the 6 and continued to believe he was all right in handling
both trials.
Plaintiff respectfully submits that his counsel was diligent in verifying that the trial
started on the 6th based upon the following:
1. Plaintiff s counsel's calendar indicated the 6th. (R. 478).
2. Plaintiffs counsel's correspondence and communications with Plaintiff
verified the 6th. (R.476-498).

24

3. The Subpoenas he served and those served by Defendant, All My Sons,
verified the 6th. (R.476-498).
4. Plaintiffs counsel's Affidavit, the Motion and Order he prepared to admit
Rhonda Jones' deposition verified the 6th. (R. 411-418).
5. The October 29, 2007 Order verified the 6th. (R. 417-418).
6. His conversation with Judge Henroid's clerk verified the 6th. (R. 479-480).
7. The lack of any written notice from the other attorneys or the trial court that the
trial was scheduled for the 5th and not the 6th. (R. 1-656).
8. The lack of any communications from the other attorneys from October 23,
2007 to November 2, 2007 that his Affidavit, Motion, and Order were wrong in stating
the trial started on the 6th.
9. The trial on the 5 in a different court that Plaintiffs counsel had to handle.
(R. 493-494).
In conjunction with the foregoing, the Preamble of the Utah Supreme Court Rules,
Chapter 23, Standards of Professionalism and Civility states
A lawyer's conduct should be characterized at all times by personal
courtesy and professional integrity in the fullest sense of those terms. In
fulfilling a duty to represent a client vigorously as lawyers, we must be
mindful of our obligations to the administration of justice, which is a truthseeking process designed to resolve human and societal problems in a
rational, peaceful, and efficient manner. We must remain committed to the
rule of law as the foundation for a just and peaceful society.
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We expect judges and lawyers will make mutual and firm
commitments to these standards.
Utah S. Ct. R., ch. 23, Preamble. Similarly, paragraph 14 states that "[ljawyers shall
advise their clients that they reserve the right to determine whether to grant
accommodations to other counsel in all matters not directly affecting the merits of the
cause or prejudicing the client's rights, such as extensions of time, continuances,
adjournments, and admissions of facts." Utah S. Ct. R., ch. 23, ]fl4. Furthermore,
paragraph 15 states that "[i]f other counsel requires a scheduling change, lawyers shall
cooperate in making any reasonable adjustments." Id. at ^[15. In the present case,
Plaintiffs counsel accommodated Defendant, All My Sons' counsel for requests to take
additional depositions of witnesses after the time for discovery had expired under the
Scheduling Order. Plaintiffs counsel allowed two additional depositions to be taken.
Plaintiffs counsel also accommodated the Defendants in allowing the deposition of the
Murray Police officer to be admitted at trial without requiring a motion.
Over the past thirty-three years, Plaintiffs counsel and probably most other
attorneys have had numerous opportunities to comply with the intent of the above
Standards of Professionalism and Civility. When other attorneys including both of
Defendants' counsel, Mr. Ludlow and Mr. Spencer, have made mistakes in calendaring
hearings and trials and have failed to appear, accommodations have been made.
Plaintiffs counsel and other attorneys he has dealt with the past have accommodated
other attorneys including Mr. Ludlow and Mr. Spencer and allowed continuances and
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adjournments until the other attorney could be present at the hearing or trial. Plaintiffs
counsel has not entered a default upon a party that was represented by an attorney when
that attorney was late or absent. Plaintiffs counsel recalls other past cases where either
Mr. Ludlow or Mr. Spencer was opposing counsel, wherein Plaintiffs counsel continued
a hearing because they did not appear due to their mistake in calendaring. Plaintiffs
counsel also recalls numerous experiences with judges, including judges now on the Utah
Court of Appeals and the Utah Supreme Court, wherein they have accommodated
attorneys who failed to appear at a trial or hearing by continuing the same rather that
entering a default or dismissal. Furthermore, Plaintiffs counsel accommodated
Defendants' counsel for the additional depositions after the time for discovery had
terminated under the scheduling Order. In allowing the accommodations, Plaintiffs
counsel was adhering to the professional courtesies as stated in the Standards
Professionalism and Civility. Plaintiff is not attempting to excuse the mistake of his
counsel, but requests that the above court consider the conduct of all counsel and parties
to determine if the trial court exceeded it's discretion in dismissing with prejudice.
If either of the Defendants' counsel had requested that the trial be continued one
day to accommodate Plaintiffs counsel's mistake, it would not have prejudiced their
client's rights since the trial would have allowed them to present all of their evidence and
have the court enter a fair decision. Plaintiffs counsel would have had to pay the
Defendants' attorney's fees and the Defendants' costs to appear for the 5 of November
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2007, but all of the preparation for trial would have still been required to proceed with the
trial on the 6 . The trial court discussed this accommodation in its Ruling of February 28,
2008 (R. 642-647, p.4). However, the trial court failed to consider the reduction of trial
time by Plaintiffs accommodations as to the number of witnesses and the Order of
October 29, 2007. Also, the court did not consider its authority to limit the Plaintiffs
case-in-chief to one day as a better solution than dismissing with prejudice and wasting
the two additional days of trial. Plaintiffs counsel has had numerous judges in the past
limit his client's case-in-chief or the other parties case-in-chief based upon various
circumstances, including, attorneys wasting the court's time due to inappropriate
examination or cross-examination, failure of the attorneys to be on time, or due to the
court's schedule. A recent example of the courts discretion to accommodate trial dates
occurred in December 2007 in the Third District Court. Richard S. Nemelka, his client,
and witnesses were present at court and ready to proceed with a trial scheduled before
Judge Leslie Lewis and reassigned to Judge Dennis Fuchs. The court declined to hear the
trial due to the Court's mistake as to the amount of time necessary for the trial and
continued the same. Regardless, the trial in the present case could have been finished in
the two remaining days because of the reduction of witnesses and the time restraints
imposed by the trial court and would not have prejudiced the parties in any regard.
The next two Rohan factors, (2) & (3), in determining whether the trial court
exceeded its discretion, i.e., "the opportunity each party has had to move the case
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forward" and "what each of the parties has done to move the case forward" have been
satisfied in this case. The trial court extended the cut-off date for fact discovery from
November 6, 2006 to 28 of February 2007 to allow additional depositions by both
parties. A request for a trial setting was filed May 16, 2007 after discovery was
completed even though Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was still pending.
The trial originally scheduled for October 15-17, 2007 was continued three weeks to
November 5-7, 2007 only because of Plaintiff s counsel's conflict. The trial scheduled on
the 5 could have been postponed only for one day to accommodate Plaintiffs counsel's
mistake.
The next factor, (4) "what difficulty or prejudice may have been caused to the
other side . . . " is vastly different in this case as compared to Rohan wherein greater
difficulty and prejudice was caused for the other side. In the present case, a
postponement of the trial for one day would not have prejudiced the Defendants except
for their appearance on the 5th for which Plaintiffs counsel was willing to pay. The
Defendants' witnesses were not subpoenaed to appear until the 6th of November 2007 and
accommodations could have been made for them to testify on the 6th. The preparation for
trial by Defendants' counsel would not be effected by a one-day delay in the trial.
The court in Rohan determined the last factor and the most important to be
"whether injustice may result from the dismissal." This factor is critical to the Plaintiff
herein. Not only was the Plaintiff assessed over $29,000.00 in attorneys' fees (which
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would be paid by his counsel), but his claim for over $300,000.00 for his stolen personal
property was dismissed with prejudice. Unlike Rohan, where the court found that he had
ample opportunity to litigate his case, the Plaintiff here did not have ample opportunity to
litigate his case; he was afforded no time in court whatsoever to present the issues of this
case at trial. There is no question that the Plaintiff, Defendants, and the trial court were
delayed one day in starting the trial due to Plaintiffs counsel's mistake, but Plaintiff and
his witnesses were ready to begin the trial on the 6th of November 2007. Both the
Defendants and the trial court had calendared the 6th and 7th of November, 2007 as trial
days. Further, unlike Rohan, neither the Plaintiff nor his counsel acted in bad faith or
were dilatory. This was an honest, unintentional, mistake, which was confirmed by the
trial court in its ruling on February 26, 2008. (R. 642-647). Furthermore, the Utah
Supreme Court in Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544
P.2d 876,879, in determining a case involving a dismissal for failure to prosecute, stated
that
It is indeed commendable to handle cases with dispatch and to move
calendars with expedition in order to keep them up to date. But it is even
more important to keep in mind that the very reason for the existence of
courts is to afford disputants an opportunity to be heard and to do justice
between them.
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the trial court exceeded its discretion in
dismissing his case with prejudice and the same should be reversed so Plaintiff may have
his "opportunity to be heard" and to have justice rendered.
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II.

The Trial Court Abused or Exceeded Its Discretion in Failing to Grant
the Motion to Set Aside.

Rule 60(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows the trial court to set
aside an order or judgment if there has been a mistake or excusable neglect and the
motion is timely filed. Plaintiff filed his Motion to Set Aside and Memorandum in
Support on November 8, 2007 just three days after the trial court dismissed his action and
awarded attorney's fees. (R. 474-475, 514-520). The Plaintiffs mistakes and excusable
neglect were relying upon his counsel's prepared pleadings, correspondence and
communications as to the date of trial and upon the trial court October 29, 2007 Order.
The Plaintiffs counsel made this major mistake. Therefore, the issue is what
consequence the Plaintiff should suffer for his counsel's mistake. In McKean v.
Mountain View Memorial Estates, 411 P.2d 129, 130-131 (Utah 1960), where an attorney
was late for the trial, the court stated,
The purpose of a default judgment is to conclude litigation when a
defendant fails to plead or otherwise defend an action. In such
circumstances its use is practical and salutary. However, it was never
intended to be used as a means of disciplining attorneys who may be
derelict in the performance of their duties. If such a course were followed it
may do a grave injustice to the client by punishing him rather than the
attorney who has done the wrong.
(emphasis added). This rule of law should be applied in the present case and the Plaintiff
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should not have been so severely punished due to his counsel's mistake, and as in
McKean, the trial court should have granted the Motion to Set Side.
The Minute Entry dated January 7, 2008 (R. 582-583) denying Plaintiffs Motion
to Set Aside, Plaintiffs objections to the award of attorneys fees, and the subsequent
entry of the judgments of the 9 of January, 2008 were extremely prejudicial to the
Plaintiff and his attorney, Richard S. Nemelka. The foregoing appear to have been
entered under a misunderstanding of the facts and contrary to law. In Menzies v. Galetka,
2006 UT 81, f63, in regard to a Rule 60(b) motion the Utah Supreme Court stated the
following:
Rule 60(b) is an equitable rule designed to balance the competing
interests of finality and fairness. See Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, % 10, JJ_
P.3d277; Laub v. S Cent Utah Tel Ass'n., 657 P.2d 1304,1306 (Utah 1982).
In balancing these competing interests, the district court must consider all of
the attendant circumstances. See Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 93 n. 2 (Utah
1986); Heath v. Mower, 597P.2d855, 858 (Utah 1979); Olsen v. Cummings,
565 P.2d 1123, 1124 (Utah 1977). Because of the equitable nature of the rule,
a district court has broad discretion to rule on a 60(b) motion. Lund, 2000 UT
75,fflj9-10,11 P.3d 277. However, this discretion is tempered by the fact that
the rule is designed to be remedial and must be liberally applied. Id. ^ 10; see
also Cmty. Dental Servs. v. Tani, 282 F.3d 1164, 1169-70 (9th Cir.2002)
(discussing rule 60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). M[J]udgment
by default is an extreme measure and a case should, whenever possible, be
decided on the merits." Tani, 282 F.3d at 1170 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted); see also State Dept. ofSoc. Servs. v. Musselman, 667 P.2d
1053, 1055 (Utah 1983) (same). Accordingly, a district court "should be
generally indulgent toward" vacating default judgments, Katz, 732 P.2d at 93,
and must "incline towards granting relief in a doubtful case to the end that the
party may have a hearing." Lund, 2000 UT 75, ^f 10,11 P.3d277 (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, "it is quite uniformly regarded as an
abuse of discretion to refuse to vacate a default judgment where there is a
reasonable justification or excuse for t h e . . . failure... and timely application
32

is made to set it aside." Id. \ 11 (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
The Utah Supreme Court also stated in Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, ^[11, "Thus,
while we review the trial court's decision in the instant case for abuse of discretion, we
emphasize that the court's discretion is not unlimited." As stated above in the previous
argument, there was a reasonable justification for the mistake made by Plaintiffs attorney
and the Plaintiff was justified in relying upon his counsel and the trial court Order of
October 29, 2007. Therefore, the trial court exceeded and abused it's discretion by failing
to grant the Motion to Set a Side when the Plaintiff has alleged sufficient grounds in his
Affidavit and the Affidavits of others. (R. 499-511, 521-523, 524-526).
The only explanation given by court in it's Minute Entry dated January 7, 2008 for
denying the Motion to Set Aside is that the "Plaintiff fails to articulate any reason which
would satisfy the requirements of Rule 60(b)." Contrary to the Minute Entry, the
following are the reasons that were articulated by Plaintiff in the Affidavits and
Memorandum (R. 476-498, 521-523, 524-526) filed in support of the Motion to Set Aside
that satisfied the requirements of Rule 60(b):
1.

The Plaintiff relied upon the Order of the court dated October 29, 2007,

which indicated the trial was scheduled for November 6-8, 2007. (R. 521-523). In the
case of Fishery. Bvbee , 2004 UT 92, If 12, the Utah Appellate Court stated that the "other
forms of unintentional conduct that rule 60(b)(1) deems eligible to be considered as
grounds to set aside a judgment-inadvertence, surprise, and excusable neglect-are aptly
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suited to describe circumstances which might befall counsel or parties." Neither the
Plaintiff nor his attorney intentionally failed to appear at the trial and said conduct should
be considered as grounds to set aside an order of dismissal.
In Airkern International v. Parker, 513 P.2d 429, 431 (Utah 1973), the court
discusses due diligence of a party as a means to make sure they will be present in court.
Contrary to Airkem, here the Plaintiff performed due diligence. Plaintiff was in constant
contact with his counsel as to the date of the trial. Plaintiff reviewed the Order of the
court stating the trial was scheduled for November 6-8, 2007. Plaintiff made plans to
attend the trial by rearranging his work schedule, obtained tickets to fly to Utah for the
assumed trial dates, and participated in making sure his witnesses would be present at the
trial on the 6th of November 2007. (R. 521-523). The Plaintiffs conduct is exactly
opposite of the conduct of the Defendant in the Airkem case and supports Plaintiffs
position that his non-appearance at the first day of trial was not intentional but was due to
inadvertence, excusable neglect, and circumstances over which the Plaintiff had no
control. The Appellate Court went on in Airkem to discuss the balancing of the two
considerations for the Trial Court in setting aside a judgment when a party has not had his
opportunity to present his case. Under this balancing of the equities of sorts, the court
determines the prejudicial effect on the parties bound by judgment. See_ Id. In accordance
with the balancing test in Airkem, the Plaintiff has established that he used due diligence
to determine when the trial started, which is a prominent factor that must be present to
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vacate a judgment. Id_ Furthermore, the Defendants' opposing memorandum to the
Motion to Set Aside, (R.551-567) states that "due diligence" is described as "the
prudence and effort that is ordinarily used by a reasonable person under the
circumstances." The Plaintiffs reliance upon the Order of the Court, his communications
with his counsel, his contact with his witnesses and arrangements for travel are more that
what a reasonable person under similar circumstances would ordinarily use.
2.

No written notice as to the exact trial date was sent to any of the parties or

their counsel by the court, and none of the attorneys filed with the court a notice of the
trial or served said notice on the other attorneys. Therefore, the only notice of the trial
that the Plaintiff had was based on his communications with his counsel and the Order of
the court. (R. 521-523, 476-498). The Plaintiff had reasonable justification to believe
that the trial started on November 6, 2007, which constitutes a reasonable excuse for the
Plaintiff failing to appear on the 5th.
3.

Another reason articulated by Plaintiff in his Motion to Set Aside was that

the attorney for the Defendant, All My Sons, had notice on the 2nd of November 2007 that
counsel for the Plaintiff had another all-day trial scheduled for the 5th of November 2007.
Defendant, All My Sons', counsel also was made aware that Plaintiffs counsel's trial was
in another court and that Plaintiffs counsel was not planning on the trial in this matter to
begin until Tuesday the 6th. Further, both Defendants' counsel knew on October 23, 2007
of Plaintiff s counsel's mistake. The court also knew on the 2nd of November 2007 that
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counsel for the Plaintiff believed the trial was to start on the 6 . (Affidavit of Richard S.
Nemelka, R. 476-498). There were also additional reasons articulated in Plaintiffs
Motion and Memorandum (R. 514-520) that justified granting said Motion that the lower
court failed to include when rendering its decision.
Although cases from other jurisdictions are not binding on the above Court, they
may be considered as persuasive authority. The Court of Appeals of Louisiana in Fidelity
Acceptance Corporation v. Brown, 382 So.2d 1007, 1010 (La.App. 1980), stated that
it is an abuse of discretion to dismiss suit, with prejudice, on basis of plaintiff s
failure to appear on scheduled trial date . . . and record was devoid of any
meaningful fact other than explanation of plaintiff s counsel that failure to
appear and proceed with merits was due to clerical error in his office.
Similarly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Shin v. Brenan, 764 A.2d 609, 612 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2000) stated that
while the trial court had the power to dismiss arbitration appeal for
Defendants' counsel's failure to attend the pretrial conference, other sanctions,
including fines, attorney's fees and contempt, rather than dismissal, were the
appropriate means of punishing counsel's behavior, where counsel's
nonappearance was inadvertent in that he failed to note conference on his
calendar.
The punishment should have been directed to Plaintiffs counsel and not the
Plaintiff and his Motion to Set Aside should have been granted in light of the equitable
notions of fair justice.
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III.

The Trial Court Erred or Abused Its Discretion in Failing to Grant the
Motion for a New Trial.

Rule 59(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows the court to grant a new
trial or to amend the judgment if there was an "irregularity in the proceedings of the court
. . . or any order of the court or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented
from having a fair trial." Rule 59(7) allows a new trial if there has been an "error of law."
Plaintiff submits that he was entitled to a new trial under both provisions of Rule 59 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The dismissal of the action was based on an irregularity in the proceedings as well
as being an abuse of discretion. The amount of over $29,000.00 of attorney's fees
awarded for all of Defendants' fees incurred during the entire litigation was excessive and
an error of law. When Plaintiffs counsel learned during the noon recess of his trial on
the 5 of his mistake of not scheduling the trial correctly, he immediately communicated
with the court. Plaintiffs counsel inquired if the trial could in fact start on the 6th but was
advised that the court had dismissed the action with prejudice and there would be no trial
on the 6th. Since the trial was scheduled for three days, there would not have been an
unbearable hardship to the court or Defendants' counsel to continue the trial for one day
so that Plaintiff and his counsel could have been present. There are numerous reasons as
to why no hardship would have occurred stated in the previous arguments above.
Plaintiff respectfully submits that all of the above stated facts constitute an irregularity in
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the proceedings justifying the trial court granting the new trial.
Plaintiff respectfully submits to the above court that there was an irregularity in
the Order entered by the trial court on October 29, 2007, as to the trial dates and under
Rule 59(1) a new trial may be granted due to an irregularity in an order of the trial court.
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the trial court abused its discretion, as argued above, in
dismissing the action with prejudice and awarding such a large amount of attorney's fees,
which appears to be excessive, based upon the sanctions available to the court for
Plaintiffs counsel's mistake. Again, under Rule 59(1) the court has the discretion to
grant a new trial if there has been an abuse of discretion preventing the Plaintiff from
having a fair trial or any trial.
The Order entered by the Court from the trial of November 5th, 2007 indicates that
the court granted the attorney's fees based on U.C.A. 78-27-56. However, there has
never been a finding by the Court that this matter was without merit or brought in bad
faith. The Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 173-175) alleging that
there was no merit to Plaintiffs case but the trial court denied said Motion (R. 338-344)
and scheduled a trial. Specifically, the Court stated in its order denying summary
judgment that, "[fjact finders may make reasonable inferences, and here the truck's
presence and activity between truck and storage unit supports the reasonable inference of
All My Sons' connection, either intentional or negligent, to the unauthorized removal and
use of Plaintiff s property." (R. 340, p. 3). The Court then states that in regards to "John
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Siddoway's alleged facilitation of the thieves' access, Defendant curiously suggests that
the claim relies on hearsay filtered through Lonnie Paulos, but this ignores the
proposition's clear support from Rhonda Jones's deposition." (R. 343, p. 6).
It seems apparent the Court concluded in its order that the Plaintiff had at least a
sufficient meritorious claim to proceed to trial and allow the trier-of-fact to determine the
outcome. (R. 343). "A claim is without merit, for purposes of determining whether
attorney fees are owed under statute providing for attorney fees award in an action
without merit if claim is frivolous, is of little weight or importance having no basis in law
or fact, or clearly lacks a legal basis for recovery." Wardley Better Homes and Garden v.
Cannon, 2002 UT 99, f 30. Again, it would appear to be the law of this case based on the
trial court's ruling that plaintiffs claims in deed had merit and were not brought in bad
faith.
"In regards to an award of attorney fees, to find that a party acted without good
faith, the trial court is required to find that he; (1) lacked an honest belief in the propriety
of the activities in question; or (2) intended to take unconscionable advantage of others;
or (3) intended to or acted with the knowledge that the activities in question would hinder,
delay or defraud others." Rohan v. Boseman, 2000 UT App 109, f39. Again, based on the
Court's Ruling in this matter, the Plaintiff did not act in bad faith in bringing this
litigation, but in fact had been damaged well over $300,000.00 from the theft of his
property. Further, the trial court stated in the ruling on February 26, 2008 (R. 642-647)
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that all of the problems were caused by a honest and unintentional mistake by Plaintiffs
counsel and no bad faith was involved.
However, the trial court does have inherent power to assess attorney's fees as
sanctions to enforce compliance with its rules. In Barnard v. Wasserman, 855 P.2d 243
(Utah 1993), Brian Barnard, an attorney, contested an award of $430.00 against him
individually for making a mistake. The Utah Supreme Court stated, "[a]s we suggested in
In re Evans, courts of general jurisdiction, such as the district court in this case, possess
certain inherent power to impose monetary sanctions on attorneys who by their conduct
thwart the court's scheduling and movement of cases through the court." Id. at 249. The
trial court in the present case did not articulate the basis for awarding all of the
Defendants' attorney's fees incurred throughout the entire litigation of over $29,000.00.
Plaintiff contends that the rule of law stated in Barnard would not support such an award
against the Plaintiff, especially when the Plaintiff was free from any action that thwarted
the trial court going forward with the trial. An award of fees against Plaintiffs counsel
for the costs incurred for the appearance on the 5th of November 2007, however, would
have been appropriate and within the scope of Barnard.
Plaintiff, based upon the above, respectfully submits that the trial court erred as a
matter of law in awarding attorney fees of over $29,000.00 and under Rule 59(7) Plaintiff
should have been granted a new trial. Plaintiffs counsel also submits to the above court

that the failure of the Plaintiff and his counsel to appear at the first day of the trial was
due to Plaintiffs counsel's mistake and Plaintiff should not be so severely penalized
thereby.

IV.

The Trial Court Erred and Abused Its Discretion in Awarding
Attorney's Fees.

Had the trial court allowed the trial to proceed and had the Defendants prevailed,
they would not have been entitled to an award of attorney's fees since there was no
contract between the parties allowing fees and there were no statutory provisions entitling
the prevailing party to an award of fees. Rohan v. Boseman, 2000 UT App 109, ^}34;
Jensen v. BowcutU 892 P.2d 1053, 1058 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). As argued above, there
was no basis to award fees under U.C.A. 78-27-56 either. Therefore, the only basis for an
award of attorney's fees would be under the trial courts inherent powers as stated above.
However, neither of the Defendants requested nor did the trail court find that attorney's
fees were appropriate to be awarded under said inherent power.
In the trial court's Order from Trial, (R. 469-471) the trial court awarded fees
under U.C.A. 78-27-56 although there was no finding that the litigation was without merit
and brought in bad faith, in fact the contrary was true. As stated above, the Defendants
allege in their Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum, (R. 173-184) and their

Motion for Attorney's Fees (R. 170-172) that the action was without merit and not
brought in good faith and requested fees under U.C.A. 78-27-56. However, the trial court
denied said Motions and specifically stated that, "[f]act-finders may make reasonable
inferences, and here the truck's presence and activity between truck and storage unit
supports the reasonable inference of All My sons' connection either intentional or
negligent, to the unauthorized removal and use of Plaintiff s property." (Page 3 & 4 in
Order Denying Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment) (R. 338-344). More
importantly the trial court in its Ruling of February 28, 2008 states that u[t]he Court has
made no ruling that the Plaintiffs case is without merit." (R. 642-647,1J4).
Therefore, the trial court erred as a matter of law in awarding attorney's fees under
U.C.A. 78-27-56. Specifically, the court denied attorney's fees in its Order Denying the
Motion for Summary Judgment, acknowledged that the case has merit in its Ruling of
February 28, 2008, and failed to make any additional findings of lack of merit and bad
faith. In conjunction, a finding of "bad faith" under Section 78-27-56 requires a specific
finding of intent related to that allegation. See Faust v. KAI Technologies, 2000 UT 82,

1116.
If it is assumed that the trial court awarded the fees under its inherent power, then
there was an abuse of discretion in awarding all of the attorney's fees incurred by the
Defendants rather than the fees incurred as a direct result of Plaintiff s counsel's mistake.

Both counsel for both Defendants only requested fees at trial for their preparation for
trial. (T. 4). For the trial court to award all of the attorney's fees incurred is contrary to
the bounds of the court's authority to "to control proceedings before it. .. and a means of
controlling the conduct of attorneys" Barnard at 249. Therefore, under an abuse of
discretion standard the award of all of the attorney's fees should be reversed.

CONCLUSION
The Trial Court's decisions, Order of Dismissal, and Judgments for attorneys'
fees should be reversed and this matter remanded to the Trial Court for trial.

DATED this ^ P

day of June, 2008.

<?^j-—
Richard S. Nemelka
Attorney for Respondent/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This is to certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF
PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT this
~3 O day of June, 2008, postage prepaid and
addressed as follows:
Stephen D. Spencer
DAY SHELL & LILJENQUIST
45 East Vine Street
Murray, Utah 84107
Randy Ludlow
Attorney at Law
185 South State Street, Suite 208
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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ADDENDUM A

Fage 1

3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LONNIE PAULOS vs.

ALL MY SONS MOVING AND STORAGE

CASE NUMBER 060903698 Contracts

CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE
MICHELE CHRISTIANSEN
PARTIES
Plaintiff - LONNIE PAULOS
Represented by: RICHARD S NEMELKA
Defendant - ALL MY SONS MOVING AND STORAGE
Represented by: STEPHEN D SPENCER
Defendant - JOHN DOE
Defendant - S & B STORAGE
Represented by: RANDY S LUDLOW
Defendant -

JOHN DOES

1-10

Defendant - JOHN SIDDOWAY
Represented by: RANDY S LUDLOW
Plaintiff - ADVANCED ORTHOPEDICS AND SPORT
Represented by: RICHARD S NEMELKA
ACCOUNT SUMMARY
TOTAL REVENUE

Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Credit:
Balance:

371.00
371.00
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COMPLAINT 10K-MORE
Amount Due:
155.00
Amount Paid:
155.00
Amount Credit:
0.00
Balance:
0.00
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: AUDIO TAPE COPY
Amount Due:
10.00
Amount Paid:
10.00
Amount Credit:
0.00
Balance:
0.00

Page 2
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REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: APPEAL
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

205.00
205.00
0.00
0.00

1.00
1.00
0.00
0.00

CASE NOTE

PROCEEDINGS
03-03-06 Case

filed

03-03-06
03-03-06
03-03-06
03-03-06

Judge STEPHEN L HENRIOD assigned.
Filed: Complaint 10K-MORE
Fee Account created
Total Due:
155.00
COMPLAINT 10K-MORE
Payment Received:
155.00
Note: Code Description: COMPLAINT 10K-MORE
03-20-06 Filed return: 20 day summons served Hector Pineda-RA
Party Served: ALL MY SONS MOVING AND STORAGE,
Service Type: Personal
Service Date: March 08, 2006
03-27-06 Filed: Answer
ALL MY SONS MOVING AND STORAGE
04-04-06 Filed: Rule 30(b)(6) Subpoena Duces Tecum (Murray City Recorder
Office)
04-13-06 Filed return: 20 day summons
Party Served: SIDDOWAY, JOHN
Service Type: Personal
Service Date: April 11, 2006
04-13-06 Filed return: 20 day summons served Jon Siddoway-RA
Party Served: S & B STORAGE
Service Type: Personal
Service Date: April 11, 2006
04-18-06 Filed: Answer of
S & B STORAGE
JOHN SIDDOWAY
04-28-06 Filed: Certificate of Service of Defendant's Rule 26(a) (1)
Initial Disclosures
05-15-06 Filed: Certificate of Service of Plaintiff's Rule 26(a)(1)
Initial Disclosures
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05-17-06 Filed: Certificate of Service (Initial Disclosures)
05-19-06 Filed: Certificate of Service (First Set of Requests for
Admission and Interrogatories to Plaintiff)
05-26-06 Filed: Certificate of Service of Notice of Rule 34 Inspection
06-01-06 Filed order: Amended Attorney Planning Meeting Report And
Scheduling Order
Judge STEPHEN L HENRIOD
Signed May 31, 2006
06-14-06 Filed: Certificate of Service (Answers to Defendants Request
for Admissions)
06-16-06 Filed: Verified Motion For Temporary Restraining Order
06-16-06 TEMP RESTRAIN ORDER scheduled on June 26, 2006 at 03:00 PM in
Fourth Floor - W47 with Judge HENRIOD.
06-20-06 Filed: Notice of Hearing
06-22-06 Filed: Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order
06-26-06 Minute Entry - Minutes for Temp Restrain Order
Judge:
STEPHEN L HENRIOD
Clerk:
lynm
PRESENT
Defendant(s): S & B STORAGE
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): RICHARD S NEMELKA
Defendant's Attorney(s): HEATHER L THUET
Audio
Tape Number:
41
Tape Count: 255

HEARING
TAPE: 41
COUNT: 255
Counsel for both parties present.
On record the parties argued before the court. The court ruled
that the Defendant's Motion for A Temporary Restraining Order to
restrain the eviction is granted. The defendant is ordered to move
out the bio hazard and clean up storage shed immediately.
06-29-06 Filed: Certificate of Service (Answers to Defendant's All My
Sons Moving and Storage Interrogatories)
07-10-06 Filed: Objection to Defendants
Proposed
Order
08-07-06 Filed: Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel (Phillip S Ferguson,
Heather L Thuet)
08-15-06 Filed order: Amended Temporary Restraining Order
Judge STEPHEN L HENRIOD
Signed August 15, 2006
08-17-06 Filed: Notice to Appoint
10-13-06 Filed: Notice of Deposition
10-13-06 Filed: Subpoena Duces Tecum-Murray City Corporation
11-02-06 Filed: Notice of Appearance of Counsel (Randy Ludlow)
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11-13-06 Filed: Certificate of Service (Request for Admissions to
Plaintiff and First Set of Interrogatories and Request for
Production of Documents)
11-28-06 Filed: Notice of Deposition (Marko Munoz)
12-13-06 Filed: Notice of Continuance of Deposition
12-21-06 Filed: Answers to Request for Admissions
12-22-06 Filed: Subpoena-Marko Munoz (served Hector Pineoa) on return
01-04-07 Filed: Motion to Withdraw Answers to Request for Admissions and
Memorandum in Support Thereof
01-04-07 Filed: Motion to Strike First Set of Interrogatories to
Plaintiff and Request for Admissions and Memorandum in Support
Thereof
01-08-07 Filed: Motion for Protective Order and Request for Expedited
Ruling
01-08-07 Filed: Request for Ruling on Expedited Motion
01-09-07 LAW AND MOTION scheduled on January 12, 2007 at 08:30 AM in
Fourth Floor - W4 7 with Judge HENRIOD.
01-10-07 Filed: Motion for Attorney's Fees
/151-10-07 Filed: Motion for Summary Judgment
01-10-07 Filed: Affidavit of Hector Pineda in support of Motion for
Summary Judgment
01-10-07 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
01-12-07 Minute Entry - Minutes for Law and Motion
Judge:
STEPHEN L HENRIOD
Clerk:
lynm
PRESENT
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): RICHARD S NEMELKA
Defendant's Attorney(s): RANDY S LUDLOW
STEPHEN D SPENCER
Audio
Tape Number:
58
Tape Count: 8 43

HEARING
TAPE: 58
COUNT: 843
On record the Defendant's Motion for a Protective Order is argued
by Mr. Ludlow. The court orders the discovery extended to 2/28/07.
01-17-07 Filed: Letter from DepomaxMerit
01-18-07 Filed: Certificate of Service (Answers to Defendant's First Set
of Interrogatories)
01-29-07 Filed: Notice of deposition (Marko Munoz)
01-29-07 Filed order: Order
Judge STEPHEN L HENRIOD
Signed January 29, 2007
01-30-07 Filed: Notice of Deposition-Lonnie Paulos
01-30-07 Filed: Notice of Deposition-Rhonda Jones
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02-06-07 Filed: Motion for a Protective Order
02-14-07 Filed: Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Protective Order
02-23-07 Filed: Request for Hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Protective
Order
02-28-07 Filed: Response to Request for Hearing
02-28-07 MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER scheduled on March 19, 2007 at
02:30 PM in Fourth Floor - W4 7 with Judge HENRIOD.
02-28-07 Notice - NOTICE for Case 060903698 ID 11030758
MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER is scheduled.
Date: 03/19/2007
Time: 02:30 p.m.
Location: Fourth Floor - W47
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
450 SOUTH STATE STREET
SLC, UT 84114-1860
Before Judge: STEPHEN L HENRIOD
03-08-07 Filed: Motion to Continue
03-14-07 Filed: Motion for an Extension to Respond to Motion for Summary
Judgment
03-15-07 Filed: Request to Submit for Decision
(Motion for Attorney's
Fees)
03-15-07 Filed: Affidavit of Attorney's Fees
03-15-07 Filed: Request to Submit for Decision (Motion for Summary
Judgment)
03-19-07 Filed: Objection to Request to Submit for Decision (Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment)
03-19-07 Filed: Notice to Submit (Motion for an Extension to Respond to
Motion for Summary Judgment)
03-19-07 Minute Entry - Minutes for Law and Motion
Judge:
STEPHEN L HENRIOD
Clerk:
lynm
PRESENT
Defendant1s

Attorney(s):

Audio
Tape Number:

64

RANDY S LUDLOW
STEPHEN D SPENCER
Tape Count: 239

HEARING
TAPE: 64
COUNT: 239
On record the counsel for All My Sons and S&B Storage are present.
Mr. Nemelka is not present. The court orders Mr. Ludlow to prepare
the Order for the Deposition and offer Mr. Nemelka 3 dates to
choose from and they (Paulos) must pay costs of travel
here for the deposition.
03-30-07 Filed: Notice of Deposition (Rhonda Jones)
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03-30-07 Filed: Notice of Deposition (Lonnie Paulos)
04-02-07 Filed: Motion to Set Aside Order from hearing on March 19, 2007
04-03-07 Minute Entry - MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER FROM HEARING 0
Judge: STEPHEN L HENRIOD
The court reviewed the Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside Order from
Hearing on March 19, 2007 and denied it.

Dated this

day of
~20

Judge STEPHEN L HENRIOD
04-03-07 Filed order: Order (From Hearing on March 19, 2007 in re
Protective Order)
Judge STEPHEN L HENRIOD
Signed April 02, 2007
04-06-07 Filed: Response to Motion to Set aside Order from Hearing Held
on March 19, 2007
04-30-07 Filed: ReNotice of Location in Re Depositions
05-15-07 Filed: Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant, All My Sons
Motion for Summary Judgment
05-16-07 Filed: Request for Trial Setting
05-21-07 Filed: Reply Memorandum (Motion for Summary Judgment)
05-21-07 Filed: Notice to Submit for Decision (Motion for Summary
Judgment)
05-22-07 Notice - NOTICE for Case 060903698 ID 11111802
SCHEDULING CONF is scheduled.
Date: 06/18/2007
Time: 09:00 a.m.
Location: Fourth Floor - W47
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
450 SOUTH STATE STREET
SLC, UT
84114-1860
Before Judge: STEPHEN L HENRIOD
05-22-07 SCHEDULING CONF scheduled on June 18, 2007 at 09:00 AM in
Fourth Floor - W47 with Judge HENRIOD.
06-18-07 Minute Entry - Minutes for Law and MotionJudge:
STEPHEN L HENRIOD
Clerk:
lynm
TELEPHONE CONFERENCE
PRESENT
Plaintiff's Attorney (s): RICHARD S NEMELKA
Defendant's Attorney(s): RANDY S LUDLOW
STEPHEN D SPENCER
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On record the parties were present and set a trial date.
JURY TRIAL is scheduled.
Date: 10/15/2007
Time: 09:00 a.m.
Location: Fourth Floor - W47
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
4 50 SOUTH STATE STREET
SLC, UT 84114-1860
Before Judge: STEPHEN L HENRIOD
JURY TRIAL.
Date: 10/16/2007
Time: 09:00 a.m.
Location: Fourth Floor - W47
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
450 SOUTH STATE STREET
SLC, UT 84114-1860
Before Judge: STEPHEN L HENRIOD
JURY TRIAL.
Date: 10/17/2007
Time: 09:00 a.m.
Location: Fourth Floor - W47
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
450 SOUTH STATE STREET
SLC, UT 84114-1860
Before Judge: STEPHEN L HENRIOD
06-18-07 JURY TRIAL scheduled on October 15, 2007 at 09:00 AM in Fourth
Floor - W4 7 with Judge HENRIOD.
06-18-07 JURY TRIAL scheduled on October 16, 2007 at 09:00 AM in Fourth
Floor - W4 7 with Judge HENRIOD.
06-18-07 JURY TRIAL scheduled on October 17, 2007 at 09:00 AM in Fourth
Floor - W47 with Judge HENRIOD.
06-2 6-07 Filed order: Order Denying Defendant's Motion For Summary
Judgment
Judge STEPHEN L HENRIOD
Signed June 25, 2007
06-27-07 Filed: Motion to Continue Trial
F^3^d"^y7--N^ME^iKA-r-^*C-HAR-D ^S
.
07-17-07 Filed: Notice of Deposition-Rob "llerrefa
--^
07-17-07 Filed: Subpoena-Rob Herrera
)
^0^0^-^rtrtecrr---Stibp-oe aa-JOJx_x^t4arnri£ob^_H e r r e r a__
08-07-07 MOTION TO CONTINUE scheduled on August 20, 2007 at 08:45 AM in
Fourth Floor - W47 with Judge HENRIOD.
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08-07-07 Notice - NOTICE for Case 060903698 ID 11186750
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MOTION TO CONTINUE is scheduled.
Date: 08/20/2007
Time: 08:45 a.m.
Location: Fourth Floor - W47
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
4 50 SOUTH STATE STREET
SLC, UT 84114-1860
Before Judge: STEPHEN L HENRIOD
08-13-07 Filed: Opposition to Motion to Continue Trial
08-20-07 Filed: Notice of Deposition (Officer Aaron Jones, Officer Mike
Obrey)
08-20-07 Filed: Subpoena-Mike Obrey
08-20-07 Filed: Subpoena-Aaron Jones
08-20-07 JURY TRIAL Cancelled.
08-20-07 JURY TRIAL scheduled on November 05, 2007 at 09:00 AM in Fourth
Floor - W47 with Judge HENRIOD.
08-20-07 JURY TRIAL scheduled on November 07, 2007 at 09:00 AM in Fourth
Floor - W47 with Judge HENRIOD.
08-20-07 JURY TRIAL scheduled on November 08, 2007 at 09:00 AM in Fourth
Floor - W47 with Judge HENRIOD.
08-20-07 JURY TRIAL Cancelled.
Reason: Correct Calendar
08-20-07 JURY TRIAL scheduled on November 05, 2007 at 09:00 AM in Fourth
Floor - W4 7 with Judge HENRIOD.
08-20-07 JURY TRIAL scheduled on November 06, 2007 at 09:00 AM in Fourth
Floor - W4 7 with Judge HENRIOD.
08-20-07 JURY TRIAL scheduled on November 07, 2007 at 09:00 AM in Fourth
Floor - W4 7 with Judge HENRIOD.
08-20-07 Minute Entry - Minutes for Law and Motion
Judge:
STEPHEN L HENRIOD
Clerk:
lynm
PRESENT
Plaintiff's Attorney(s)
Defendant's Attorney(s)
Audio
Tape Number:

76

RICHARD S NEMELKA
RANDY S LUDLOW
STEPHEN D SPENCER

Tape Count: 903

HEARING
TAPE: 76
COUNT: 903
On record the"PlaintiffTs Motion to Continue trial was granted
without objection. A new trial date is set.
09-06-07 Filed: Notice of Service of Subpoena09-10-07 Filed: Acceptance of Service of Subpoena-Frank Nakamura on
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behalf of Aaron Jones and Mike Obrey
09-18-07 Filed: Subpoena-Rob Herrera on return

10-03-07
10-03-07
10-15-07
10-19-07
10-23-07

Filed: Subpoena-Marko A Munoz- on return
Filed: Notice of Service of Subpoena-Alfredo Villegas Munoz
Filed: Subpoena-Alfredo Villegas Munoz on return
Filed: Acceptance of Service of Subpoena -Hector Pineda
Filed: Notice to Submit for Decision (Plaintiff's Motion to
Admit the Deposition of Rhonda Jones)
10-24-07 Filed: Motion to Admit the Deposition of Rhonda Jones and
Memorandum in Support Thereof
Filed by: NEMELKA, RICHARD S
10-24-07 Filed: affidavit of Richard S Nemelka
10-29-07 Filed order: Order To Admit The Deposition of Rhonda Jones
Judge STEPHEN L HENRIOD
Signed October 26, 2007
10-31-07 Filed: Subpoena-Judy Hick on return
11-01-07 Filed: Subpoena-Jerry Erkelens on return
11-01-07 Filed: Request for Hearing (Plaintiff's Motion to Admit
Deposition of Rhonda Jones)
11-02-07 BENCH TRIAL scheduled on November 05, 2007 at 09:00 AM in
Fourth Floor - W4 7 with Judge HENRIOD.
11-02-07 JURY TRIAL Cancelled.
11-02-07 BENCH TRIAL scheduled on November 06, 2007 at 09:00 AM in
Fourth Floor - W4 7 with Judge HENRIOD.
11-02-07 JURY TRIAL Cancelled.
Reason: Correct Calendar
11-02-07 BENCH TRIAL scheduled on November 07, 2007 at 09:00 AM in
Fourth Floor - W4 7 with Judge HENRIOD.
11-02-07 JURY TRIAL Cancelled.
Reason: Correct Calendar
11-02-07 Filed: Defendant's Trial Brief
11-05-07 Minute Entry - Minutes for Bench Trial
Judge:
STEPHEN L HENRIOD
Clerk:
lynm
PRESENT
Defendant(s): JOHN SIDDOWAY
Defendant's Attorney(s): RANDY S LUDLOW
STEPHEN D SPENCER
Audio
Tape Number:
82
Tape Count: 9384 9

TRIAL
TAPE: 82
COUNT: 93849
On record Mr. Nemelka did not appear. His office finally called
and stated Mr. Nemelka was in trial in Bountiful and had it
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calendared for tomorrow. The Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and for
attorney fees is granted with prejudice. Mr. Ludlow to
prepare order.
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11-05-07 Filed- Defendant's Brief On Respondeat Superior Issues
11-05-07 Case Disposition is Dismissed
Disposition Judge is STEPHEN L HENRIOD
11-05-07 BENCH TRIAL Cancelled.
Reason: Correct Calendar
11-05-07 BENCH TRIAL Cancelled.
Reason: Correct Calendar
11-05-07 Case Disposition is Dismsd w prejudice
Disposition Judge is STEPHEN L HENRIOD
11-06-07 Fee Account created
Total Due:
10.00
11-06-07 AUDIO TAPE COPY
Payment Received:
10.00
11-06-07 Filed: Request For Recording by Mr. Nemelka (completed)
11-07-07 Filed: Affidavit of Attorney's Fees and Costs
11-07-07 Filed order: Order from Trial (November 5, 2007)
Judge STEPHEN L HENRIOD
Signed November 07, 2007
11-08-07 Filed: Objection to Proposed Orders Attorneys' Fees
11-08-07 Filed: Motion to Set Aside Order of Dismissal
Filed by: NEMELKA, RICHARD S
11-08-07 Filed: Affidavit of Richard S Nemelka
11-08-07 Filed: Affidavit of Attorney's Fees and Costs
11-08-07 Filed: Objections to Proposed Orders Attorney's Fees
11-08-07 Filed: Memorandum m Support of Motion to Set Aside Order cf
Dismissal of November 5, 2007
11-09-07 Filed: Affidavit of Lonnie Paulos
11-09-07 Filed: Affidavit of Jayne Nemelka
11-15-07 Filed: Objection to S&B Attorney Fees
11-19-07 Filed: Reply m Opposition to Set Aside Dismissal
11-19-07 Filed: Affidavit of Defendant's Attorney
11-19-07 Filed: Memorandum m Opposition to Motion to Set Aside Order of
dismissal
11-27-07 Filed: Reply to Objection to S&B's Attorney's Fees
11-27-07 Filed: Notice to Submit for Decision (Objection to Proposed
Orders Attorneys' Fees)
11-28-07 Filed: Reply Memorandum m Support of Motion to Set Aside Order
of Dismissal of November 5, 2007
11-28-07 Filed: Notice to Submit for Decision (Motion to Set Aside the
Order of Dismissal)
01-08-08 Filed order: Minute Entry (Motion to Set Aside Order of
Dismissal)
Judge STEPHEN L HENRIOD
Signed January 07, 2008
01-08-08 Filed order: Judgment (on behalf of Jon Siddoway)
Judge STEPHEN L HENRIOD
Signed January 08, 2008
01-09-08 Judgment #1 Entered
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Debtor:
ADVANCED ORTHOPEDICS AND SPORT
Creditor: ALL MY SONS MOVING AND STORAGE
Debtor:
LONNIE PAULOS
16,973.60 Total Judgment

16,973.60 Judgment Grand Total
01-09-08 Filed judgment: Judgment @J
Judge STEPHEN L HENRIOD
Signed January 08, 2008
01-09-08 Judgment #2 Entered
Debtor:
ADVANCED ORTHOPEDICS AND SPORT
Creditor: JOHN SIDDOWAY
Debtor:
LONNIE PAULOS
11,314.00 Attorneys Fees
738.41 Costs
12,052.41 Judgment Grand Total
01-09-08 Filed judgment: Judgment (on behalf of Jon Siddoway) @J
Judge STEPHEN L HENRIOD
Signed January 08, 2008
01-11-08 Filed: Motion to Stay Judgment Pending Disposition of Motion
for New trial
01-11-08 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Motion to Stay Judgment Under
Rule 62
01-11-08 Filed: Motion for New Trial or to Amend Judgment Under Rule 59
01-18-08 Filed: Objection to Order on Plaintiff's Motion to Set aside
01-22-08 Filed: Response to Motion for New Trial and Memorandum
01-24-08 Filed: Reply to Plaintiff's Objection to Defendant's Proposed
Order
01-24-08 Filed: Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Stay Judgment
01-24-08 Filed: Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for New Trial
01-29-08 Filed: Reply Memorandum of Plaintiff in support of Motion for
New Trial
01-29-08 Filed: Notice to Submit (Motion for New Trial)
02-01-08 Filed order: Order On Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside Dismissal
and Plaintiff's Objection To Attorney's Fees
Judge STEPHEN L HENRIOD
Signed January 30, 2008
02-02-08 Filed: Notice to Submit (Motion to Stay Judgment Pending
Disposition)
02-26-08 Filed order: Ruling (Motion to Set Aside (Denied))
Judge STEPHEN L HENRIOD
Signed February 21, 2008
02-29-08 Filed: Motion to Stay Judgment Pending Disposition of Appeal
02-29-08 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Motion to Stay Judgment Under
Rule 62
02-29-08 Filed: Supersedeas Bond With Undertaking for Personal Bond
02-29-08 Filed: Notice of Appeal
02-29-08 Fee Account created
Total Due:
205.00
02-29-08 APPEAL
Payment Received:
205.00
Note: Code Description: APPEAL
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03-04-08 Note: Certified copy of Notice of Appeal forwarded to the Utah
Court of Appeals
03-13-08 Filed: Supreme Court of Utah - Order - Twenty days from the
date of this order, this matter will be transferred to the Utah
Court of Appeals for disposition. - 20080196-SC
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03-13-08 Filed: Supreme Court of Utah - Letter to Counsel - The notice
of appeal has been filed. The case number is 20080196 and
should be indicated on future filings and correspondence. 20080196-SC
03-18-08 Fee Account created
Total Due:
1.00
03-18-08 COPY FEE
Payment Received:
1.00
Note: 5.00 cash tendered.
4 change given.
03-19-08 Filed: Notice to Submit (Motion for a Stay pending Appeal)
04-04-08 Filed: Utah Court of Appeals - Letter to Counsel - This case
has been assigned to the Court of Appeals. The case number will
remain the same, with a -CA after the number. - 20080196-CA
04-28-08 Note: Certified copy of Request for Transcript forwarded to the
Utah Court of Appeals.
04-30-08 Judge MICHELE CHRISTIANSEN assigned.
05-19-08 Filed: Transcript of Bench Trial dated 11-5-07, Carolyn
Erickson, CCT
05-19-08 Filed: Notice of Filing Transcript of Bench Trial dated
11-5-07, Carolyn Erickson, CCT
05-21-08 Note: INDEXED
05-21-08 Note: Certified copy of Record Index forwarded to the Utah
Court of Appeals.
05-30-08 Filed: Objection to Bond and Stay of Execution
06-06-08 Filed: Request to Submit for Decision Plaintiff's Motion to
Stay
06-06-08 Filed: Verified Response to Objection to Stay
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RICHARD S. NEMELKA #2396
STEPHEN R. NEMELKA #9239
NEMELKA & NEMELKA
6806 South 1300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
Telephone: (801) 568-9191
Fax:(801)568-9196
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Virgil

Attorney for Plaintiffs
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LONIE PAULOS and ADVANCED
ORTHOPEDICS and SPORTS
MEDICINE, LLC, a Utah Corporation,

)
)

AFFIDAVIT OF
RICHARD S. NEMELKA

Plaintiffs,
vs.
ALL MY SONS MOVING AND
STORAGE, a business entity, JOHN DOE
doing business as All My Sons Moving
and Storage, and S & B STORAGE,
a business entity, and JOHN SIDDOWAY
doing business as S & B STORAGE , and
JOHN DOES 1-10,

;)
;)
]
;
;
]
]

Defendants.

)

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

Civil No. 060903698
Judge Stephen Henroid

)
: ss.
)

Richard S. Nemelka, being first duly sworn upon his oath hereby deposes and
states as follows:
1. That he is the attorney for the Plaintiffs in the above-entitled matter and has
personal knowledge as to the facts alleged herein and is competent to testify to the same.

2. On the 8 day of June, 2007, a Scheduling Conference was held before the
Court wherein a Jury Trial was scheduled for October 15, 16 and 17, 2007.
3. On the 27th day of June, 2007, affiant filed a Motion to Continue the Trial on
behalf of the Plaintiffs.
4. The Motion to Continue was heard on the 20th day of August, 2007, and at said
hearing the Court suggested the following three alternative dates for the trial:
(a) November 5, 6 and 7, 2007
(b) October 29, 30 and 31, 2007
(c) Next year in 2008.
5. At the hearing held on the 20th of August, 2007, Randy Ludlow, counsel for
the Defendants, S & B Storage, indicated he had a conflict with November 5, 6 and 7
since he was going with his wife to Chicago on the 4th, 5th and 6th of November, 2007.
However, Mr. Ludlow withdrew his objection when affiant indicated that he was fine
with doing the trial next year and indicated to the Court that he would cancel his trip to
Chicago. Thereafter, a discussion was held between the Court and the attorneys in regard
to settling the case and the potential litigation against the insurance company. The
hearing concluded without any specific statements made as to the exact dates of the trial
although, based upon Mr. Ludlow's withdrawal of his objection to the dates of November
5, 6 and 7, 2007, it was apparently assumed by the Court and the attorneys that the trial
was rescheduled for November 5, 6 and 7, 2007.
6. A Minute Entry was entered on the docket on the 20th of August, 2007
scheduling a Jury Trial for November 5th, November 7th and November 8th, 2007. Said
Minute Entry was corrected on said date and an entry was made that the Jury Trial was

scheduled for November 5th, 6th and t \ 2007. A copy of the docket sheet is attached
hereto.
7. Neither the Court nor any of the attorneys prepared a Notice of the
Continuance of the Trial and no notice was served on any of the parties through their
attorneys.
8. Apparently when affiant returned to his office he was under the impression
that the Trial was scheduled for November 6th, 7th and 8th, 2007, and wrote said dates on
his calendar. His calendar is attached hereto as Exhibit "B" and incorporated herein by
reference.
9. Counsel for the Plaintiffs already had a Trial scheduled for Monday,
November 5, 2007, before the Honorable Thomas Kay in the Second Judicial District
Court in Bountiful, Utah, and a copy of the Notice of Trial is attached hereto as Exhibit
"C" along with affiant's calendar for Monday, November 5, 2007. On approximately the
24th of October, 2007, affiant on behalf of the Plaintiffs, filed a Motion to Admit the
Deposition of Rhonda Jones along with a Memorandum in Support Thereof, the
Affidavit of Richard S. Nemelka, and a proposed Order. Said pleadings are attached
hereto as Exhibit "D" and incorporated herein by reference. All of the pleadings filed by
Richard S. Nemelka indicated that the trial was scheduled for November 6th through 8th of
2007 and were mailed to both attorneys for the Defendants.
10. On the 29th of October, 2007, the Court signed an Order to admit the
Deposition of Rhonda Jones and said Order specifically stated, in paragraph 1, "That the
deposition of Rhonda Jones on April 30, 2007, shall be admitted into evidence to be used

during the trial scheduled for November 6-8, 2007, in the above-entitled matter." A copy
of the Order is attached hereto as Exhibit UE" and incorporated herein by reference.
11. Affiant prepared Subpoenas and served the same upon witnesses all
indicating that the trial was scheduled to begin on the 6th of November, 2007. A copy of
one Subpoena is attached hereto as Exhibit "F" and incorporated herein by reference.
12. Stephen D. Spencer, counsel for the Defendant, All My Sons Moving and
Storage, also filed various Subpoenas indicating that the trial was scheduled for
November 6th and 7th of 2007. Said pleadings are attached hereto as Exhibit "G" and
incorporated herein by reference.
13. That on or about the 2 nd of November 2007 affiant had a conversation with
Stephen D. Spencer, attorney for the Defendant, All My Sons Moving and Storage, where
it was discussed whether or not the trial was a Jury Trial or a Bench Trial. Affiant
specifically stated to Mr. Spencer that he believed it was a Bench Trial and that the Trial
th

was to begin on Tuesday, the 6 of November, 2007. Mr. Spencer indicated that he
thought the Trial was scheduled for Monday, the 5th of November, 2007; however, affiant
specifically stated to Mr. Spencer that was inaccurate and, in fact, the Trial was
scheduled to begin on Tuesday, the 6th of November, 2007 and would not have been
scheduled on the 5th of November, 2007 for the reason that affiant had to be in attendance
at another trial before Judge Kay in the Second District Court which began at 8:30 a.m.
on the 5th of November, 2007.
14. Further, on the 2nd of November, 2007, affiant had a conversation with Lyn
MacLeod, Judge Henroid's Clerk, wherein it was agreed that the Trial would be a Bench
Trial. At the beginning of said conversation between affiant and Lyn MacLeod, affiant

indicated that he was calling in regard to the Paulos Trial that was scheduled for next
Tuesday (November 6, 2007) and that there was a question as to whether or not the trial
was a Jury Trial or a Bench Trial. There was no discussion between affiant and Lyn
MacLeod in regard to whether or not the trial was to begin on Monday, the 5* of
November or Tuesday, the 6th of November and affiant continued to believe that the trial
was scheduled to begin on the 6th of November, 2007.
15. Affiant, on or about the 30th of October, 2007, was advised that Judge
Henroid has signed the Order to admit the Deposition of Rhonda Jones which, again,
indicated that the trial was scheduled for November 6-8, 2007.
16. Immediately after the hearing held on the 20th of August, 2007, affiant
dictated a letter which was sent to his client, Lonnie Paulos, on the 22nd of August, 2007
indicating that the trial was scheduled for November 6th, 7th, and 8th, 2007. A copy of the
letter is attached hereto as Exhibit "H" and incorporated herein by reference.
17. That the Plaintiff, Lonnie Paulos, was always of the understanding that the
trial was scheduled to begin on the 6th of November, 2007 and, in fact, had re-arranged
his work schedule so that he could be in Utah on the evening of November 5, 2007. Mr.
Paulos had scheduled his airline travel to leave Houston, Texas, in the afternoon of
November 5, 2007, and was on his way to the airport when he was contacted by affiant at
approximately 12:30 p.m. on the 5th of November, 2007 wherein affiant indicated to Mr.
Paulos that the Court had dismissed the action.
18. Affiant had also scheduled all of Plaintiffs' witnesses to appear on Tuesday,
the 6th of November, 2007.

19. Affiant's office had also arranged for an interpreter to be present on Tuesday,
<th

the 6 of November, 2007, to act as an interpreter for one of Plaintiffs' witnesses, as well
as advising another individual to be present on the 6th of November, 2007 to read the
deposition of Ronda Jones.
20. Affiant had numerous conversations with his client, Lonnie Paulos, and
witnesses in preparation for the trial and affiant advised all witnesses that the trial was
scheduled to begin on the 6th of November, 2007.
21. In the last few months affiant has had other problems in regard to his short
term memory. Affiant is not offering an excuse for his mistake in regard to assuming on
the 20th of August, 2007, that the trial was scheduled for November 6th, 7th and 8th;
however, affiant did not intentionally write down the wrong dates or intentionally not
th

appear at the trial on the 5 of November, 2007 since he was involved in another trial on
said date and time.
DATED this j f

day of November, 2007.
RICHARD S. NEMEL^A
Attorney for Plaintiffs

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this <^
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day of November, 2007.

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing in Salt Lake County, Utah

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Affidavit to the following,
postage prepaid, this £ day of November, 2007:
Stephen D. Spencer
DAY SHELL & LILJENQUIST
45 East Vine Street
Murray, Utah 84107
Randy Ludlow
Attorney at Law
185 South State Street, Suite 208
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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RICHARD S. NEMELKA #2396
STEPHEN R. NEMELKA #9239
NEMELKA & NEMELKA
6806 South 1300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
Telephone: (801)568-9191
Fax: (801)568-9196

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

OCT 2 9 2007
SALT LAKE COUNTY
By.

•i21

OeouU Clerk

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ORDER TO ADMIT
THE DEPOSITION OF
RHONDA JONES

LONNIE PAULOS and ADVANCED
ORTHOPEDICS and SPORTS
MEDICINE L L C , a Utah Corporation,
Plaintiff,

Civil No: 060903698

vs.
ALL MY SONS MOVING AND
STORAGE, a business entity, JOHN DOE,
doing business as AH My Sons Moving and
Storage, and S & B STORAGE, a business
entity, and JOHN SIDDOWAY, doing
business as S & B Storage, and JOHN
DOES 1-10,

Judge: Stephen Henroid

Defendants.
Based upon the Motion to Admit the Deposition of Rhonda Jones and Memorandum in
Support Thereof of the Plaintiff, and good cause appearing therefore IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED, DECREED, AND ADJUDGED AS FOLLOWS:

1.

That the Deposition of Rhonda Jones on April 30,2007 shall be admitted into

evidence to be used during the trial scheduled for November 6-8, 2007 in the above-entitled
matter.

DATED this M/

day of October, 2007.
BY THE COURT:

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a true and Correct copy of the foregoing ORDER TO ADMIT THE
DEPOSITION OF RHONDA JONES was mailed, postage prepaid, this t z ^ d a y of
OCTOBER, 2007, to:
Stephen D. Spencer
DAY SHELL & LILJENQUIST
45 East Vine Street
Murray, Utah 84107
Randy Ludlow
Attorney at Law
185 South State Street, Suite 208
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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RICHARD S. NEMELKA #2396
STEPHEN R. NEMELKA #9239
NEMELKA & NEMELKA
6806 South 1300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
Telephone: (801)568-9191
Fax: (801)568-9196
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Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

LONNIE PAULOS and ADVANCED
ORTHOPEDICS and SPORTS
MEDICINE LLC, a Utah Corporation,

AFFIDAVIT OF
RICHARD S. NEMELKA

Plaintiff,
Civil No: 060903698
VS.

Judge: Stephen Henroid
ALL MY SONS MOVING AND
STORAGE, a business entity, JOHN DOE,
doing business as AH My Sons Moving and
Storage, and S & B STORAGE, a business
entity, and JOHN SIDDOWAY, doing
business as S & B Storage, and JOHN
DOES 1-10,
Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Richard S. Nemelka, being first duly sworn upon his oath, hereby deposes and states as
follows:

1.

That he is the attorney for the Plaintiff, Lonnie Paulos, in the above-entitled

matter and has personal knowledge of the facts alleged and is competent to testify to the same.
2.

That he knows that Rhonda Jones is allegedly residing in Houston, Texas.

3.

That he has personally attempted to locate Rhonda Jones by telephone and

through her alleged address located in Houston, Texas to no avail.
4.

The he has attempted to serve her legal pleadings at her address in Houston, Texas

but said pleadings were returned and sent a second time to another process server.
5.

That he has not colluded with Rhonda Jones, nor his client to procure her absence

from the trial scheduled for November 6-8, 2007 in the above-entitled matter.
6.

That sometime after her deposition on April 30, 2007, her employed with Dr.

Paulos and Baylor University was terminated.

d
DATED this >"12
ay of October, 2007.
*—
. *

l
J

\

x

RICHARD S. NEMELKA

9'?

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ^J

day of October, 2007.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF
RICHARD S. NEMELKA was mailed, postage prepaid, this ?J\ day of OCTOBER, 2007,
r
to:
"
Stephen D. Spencer
DAY SHELL & LILJENQUIST
45 East Vine Street
Murray, Utah 84107
Randy Ludlow
Attorney at Law
185 South State Street, Suite 208
Salt Lake City, Utah 84 H i

FILED
RICHARD S. NEMELKA #2396
STEPHEN R. NEMELKA #9239
NEMELKA & NEMELKA
6806 South 1300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
Telephone: (801)568-9191
Fax: (801)568-9196
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Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

MOTION TO ADMIT THE
DEPOSITION OF RHONDA
JONES AND MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT THEREOF

LONNIE PAULOS and ADVANCED
ORTHOPEDICS and SPORTS
MEDICINE L L C , a Utah Corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No: 060903698
ALL MY SONS MOVING AND
STORAGE, a business entity, JOHN DOE,
doing business as All My Sons Moving and
Storage, and S & B STORAGE, a business
entity, and JOHN SIDDOWAY, doing
business as S & B Storage, and JOHN
DOES 1-10,

Judge: Stephen Henroid

Defendants.

MOTION
Plaintiff, by and through their attorney, Richard S. Nemelka, respectfully moves this court
to admit the Deposition of Rhonda Jones taken on April 30, 2007 in lieu of her appearance for
direct examination in the trial scheduled for November 6-8, 2007. Plaintiff hereby submits the
following Memorandum in support of his Motion:

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
FACTS
1.

Rhonda Jones resides somewhere in Houston, Texas. Aff. Richard S. Nemelka ^

2 (Oct. 23, 2007).
2.

Plaintiff and his attorney, Richard S. Nemelka, have been unable to contact or

locate Rhonda Jones for service of subpoena. Id. at ^ 3-4.
3.

Plaintiff and his attorney, have used due diligence in an attempt to locate Rhonda

Jones. Id.
4.

Neither the Plaintiff, nor his attorney, used any colluded efforts to procure the

absence of Rhonda Jones. Id. at If 5.
ARGUMENT
5.

Pursuant to Rule 32(a)(3)(B) and (D) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the

court has the discretion to use the deposition of a witness in lieu of their testimony if they cannot
be located under the jurisdiction of this court to be served a subpoena . The deponent, Rhonda
Jones, allegedly resides in Houston, Texas which is a greater distance than 100 miles from the
place of trial. Aff. Richard S. Nemelka 1j 2 (Oct. 23, 2007). Additionally, Richard S. Nemelka
has specifically stated that there has been no collusion to procure Rhonda Jones' absence as a
witness. Id. at If 5. Rhonda Jones is simply unavailable to procure her attendance by subpoena.
6.

Similarly, the Court of Appeals of Utah has specifically allowed the deposition of

a potential witness to be admitted for evidentiary purposes when the deponent cannot be located
through due diligence. Evans ex rel Evans v. Langston, 2007 UT App 240, lffll4-16, 166 P.3d
621. As long as no collusion is involved to procure the absence of the deponent and the
deponent is greater than 100 miles from the court of jurisdiction, the court has the ability to admit

AOTA

the deposition in lieu of direct examination. Id. atfflJ14-16.Additionally, Plaintiff, by and
through his attorney, Richard S. Nemelka, performed due diligence in attempting to locate
Rhonda Jones. Aff. Richard S. Nemelkaffi[3-4(Oct. 23, 2007).
7.

This Court should allow the deposition of Rhonda Jones to be admitted in lieu of

direct examination; she cannot be located though due diligence, she is not within a 100 mile
jurisdictional radius of this Court, nor has there been any collusion by any party to procure the
absence of the deponent. Therefore, admittance of the Deposition of Rhonda Jones on April 30,
2007 is appropriate.

DATED this J ^ d a y of October, 2007.

L,.
RICHARD S. NEMELKA
Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO ADMIT THE
DEPOSITION OF RHONDA JONES AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT THEREOF
was mailed, postage prepaid, this V ^ day of OCTOBER, 2007, to:
Stephen D. Spencer
DAY SHELL & LILJENQUIST
45 East Vine Street
Murray, Utah 84107
Randy Ludlow
Attorney at Law
185 South State Street, Suite 208
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LONNIE PAULOS Et al,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
LAW AND MOTION

vs.

Case No: 060903698 CN

ALL MY SONS MOVING AND STORAGE
Et al,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

Clerk:

STEPHEN L HENRIOD
August 20, 2007

lynm

PRESENT
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): RICHARD S NEMELKA
Defendant's Attorney(s): RANDY S LUDLOW
STEPHEN D SPENCER
Audio
Tape Number:
76
Tape Count: 9 03

HEARING
TAPE: 7 6
COUNT: 9 03
On record the Plaintiff's Motion to Continue trial was granted
without objection. A new trial date is set.

A 5,6 * r A®*
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Nemelka & Nemelka
Attorneys at Law
Carl J Nemelka
Rjchard S bternclka
Stephen R Nemelka
RheccB Nemelka*
"Also Admitted in Montana

1935 1988

Joseph N Nemelkajr
1949 1999

August 22, 2007

Lonnie Paulos M.D.
3 805 Meadow Lake Lane
Houston, Texas 77027
Re: Paulos vs. All My Sons
Dear Lonnie:
We had a scheduling hearing before Judge Henriod this morning and he rescheduled the
trial for November the 6th, 7th and 8th, 2007. We will need to get together the week prior thereto to
prepare for the same. If you have nay questions, please give me a call.

Respectfully,

Richard S. Nemelka
RSN:sdb
Enclosure

ft
6 3 0 6 South HOO Ease / Salt Lake C.cv Utah

8412

>-v
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RICHARD S. NEMELKA #2396
STEPHEN R. NEMELKA #9239
NEMELKA & NEMELKA
6806 South 1300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
Telephone: (801)568-9191
Fax: (801)568-9196

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

KATHLEEN C. MARK,

NOTICE OF TRIAL

Petitioner,
RICKIE D. MARK,

Civil No.: 064701186DA
Judge: Thomas Kay
Commissioner: David S. Dillon

Respondent

Notice is hereby given that the Trial in the above-entitled matter is hereby scheduled for
Monday, the 5th of November, 2007, at 8:30 a.m. before the Honorable Thomas Kay of the
above-entitled Court at his Courtroom at the Courts Building, 805 South Main Street Bountiful,
Utah. The parties shall exchange witness and exhibits list on or before Monday the 29th of
October, 2007.
DATED this the It? day of August, 2007.
NEMELKA & NEMELKA

RichifdS.Nemelka

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This is to certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Trial this
day of August, 2007, postage prepaid and addressed as follows:
John Cummings
Attorney at Law
3856 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 84403
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^SE NUMBER 060903698 Contracts
Floor - W4 7 with Judge HENRIOD.
1-20-07 JURY TRIAL scheduled on November 08, 2007
Floor - W4 7 with Judge HENRIOD.
i-20-07 JURY TRIAL Cancelled.
Reason: Correct Calendar
.-20-07 JURY TRIAL scheduled on November 05, 2007
Floor - W4 7 with Judge HENRIOD.
-20-07 JURY TRIAL scheduled on November 06, 2007
Floor - W4 7 with Judge HENRIOD.
-20-07 JURY TRIAL scheduled on November 07, 20 07
Floor - W4 7 with Judge HENRIOD.
-20-07 Minute Entry - Minutes for Law and Motion
Judge:
STEPHEN L HENRIOD
Clerk:
lynm
PRESENT

at 09:00 AM in Fourth

at 09:00 AM in Fourth
at 09:00 AM in Fourth
at 09:00 AM in Fourth

Plaintiff's Attorney(s): RICHARD S NEMELKA
Defendant's Attorney(s): RANDY S LUDLOW
STEPHEN D SPENCER
Audio
Tape Number:
76
Tape Count: 903

HEARING
TAPE: 76
COUNT: 903
On record the Plaintiff's Motion to Continue trial was granted
without objection. A new trial date is set.
-06-07 Filed: Notice of Service of Subpoena-10-07 Filed: Acceptance of Service of Subpoena-Frank Nakamura on
behalf of Aaron Jones and Mike Obrey
-18-07 Filed Subpoena-Rob Herrera on return
-03-07 Filed Subpoena-Marko A Munoz- on return
-03-07 Filed Notice of Service of Subpoena-Alfredo Villegas Munoz
-15-07 Filed Subpoena-Alfredo Villegas Munoz on return
-19-07 Filed Acceptance of Service of Subpoena -Hector Pineda
-23-07 Filed Notice to Submit for Decision (Plaintiff's Motion to
Admit the Deposition of Rhonda Jones)
-24-07 Filed: Motion to Admit the Deposition of Rhonda Jones and
Memorandum in Support Thereof
Filed by: NEMELKA, RICHARD S
-24-07 Filed: affidavit of Richard S Nemelka
•2 9-07 Filed order: Order To Admit The Deposition of Rhonda Jones
Judge STEPHEN L HENRIOD
Signed October 26, 2007
•31-07 Filed Subpoena-Judy Hick on return
•01-07 Filed Subpoena-Jerry Erkelens on return
•01-07 Filed Request for Hearing (Plaintiff's Motion to Admit

.nted: 11/06/07 08:51:09
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RICHARD S. NEMELKA #2396
STEPHEN R. NEMELKA #9239
NEMELKA & NEMELKA
6806 South 1300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
Telephone: (801)568-9191
Fax: (801)568-9196
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

LONNIE PAULOS and ADVANCED
ORTHOPEDICS and SPORTS
MEDICINE LLC, a Utah Corporation,

SUBPOENA

Plaintiff,

Civil No: 060903698
Judge: Stephen Henroid

vs.
ALL MY SONS MOVING AND
STORAGE, a business entity, JOHN DOE,
doing business as AH My Sons Moving and
Storage, and S & B STORAGE, a business
entity, and JOHN SIDDOWAY, doing
business as S & B Storage, and JOHN
DOES 1-10,
Defendants.

J

TO: JERRY ERKELENS
919 E. FIRST AVENUE
SLC, UT 84103
YOU ARE REQUIRED:
§jX) ; to appear in the above-named Court at the place, date and time specified below to testify
Date
|f/06/07

Time
9:00 a.m.

Place
450 S. State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

l\ r* t

Stephen D.Spencer (8913)
D A Y SHELL & LILJENQUIST, L.C.

Attorney for Defendant (All My Sons Moving and Storage)
45 East Vine Street
Murray, UT 84107
Telephone: (801) 262-6800
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

LONNIE PAULOS and ADVANCED
ORTHOPEDICS and SPORTS MEDICINE
LLC, a Utah Corporation,

ACCEPTANCE OF SERVICE OF
SUBPOENA

Plaintiff,

ALL MY SONS MOVING AND STORAGE,
a business entity, JOHN DOE, doing business
as All My Sons Moving and Storage, and
S & B STORAGE, a business entity, and
JOHN SIDDOWAY, doing business as S & B
Storage, and JOHN DOES 1-10

Cases No. 060903698

Judge Stephen L. Henriod
Defendants.

STATE OF "UTAH

)

) ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

I, Hector Pineda, hereby accept service of the subpoena to appear at the trial now
scheduled for November 6 and 7, 2007, in the above captioned matter, on behalf of Officers
Aaron Jones and Mike Obrey.
DATED this _L_ day of

^o/^/^^2007.

Stephen D.Spencer (8913)
D A Y SHELL & LILJENQUIST, L.C.

Attorney for Defendant (All My Sons Moving and Storage)
45 East Vine Street
Murray, UT 84107
Telephone: (801)262-6800
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

LONNIE PAULOS and ADVANCED
ORTHOPEDICS and SPORTS MEDICINE
LLC, a Utah Corporation,

SUBPOENA

Plaintiff,
V.

ALL MY SONS MOVING AND STORAGE,
a business entity, JOHN DOE, doing business
as All My Sons Moving and Storage, and
S & B STORAGE, a business entity, and
JOHN SIDDOWAY, doing business as S & B
Storage, and JOHN DOES 1 -10

Cases No. 060903698

Judge Stephen L. Henriod
Defendants.
THE STATE OF UTAH SENDS GREETINGS TO:

Officer Mike Obrey
Murray Police Department
5025 S. State St.
Murray, UT 84107

WE COMMAND YOU, that all singular business and excuses being laid aside, you
appear and attend before the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, at a hearing to be held on the 6th and 7th days of November, 2007, at 9:00 a.m., Fourth
Floor - Room W47, 450 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, then and there to testify in the
above-entitled action now pending in said District Court on the part of the Defendant.
attached Addendum "A" Notice to Persons Served with a Subpoena.
DATED this

S

day of September, 2007.

Attorney for Petitioner and
Officer of this Court

See

ADDENDUM C

RICHARD S. NEMELKA #2396
STEPHEN R. NEMELKA #9239
NEMELKA & NEMELKA
6806 South 1300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
Telephone: (801)568-9191
Fax: (801)568-9196

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

OCT 2 9 2007
SALT LAKE COUNTY

By.

'M]

Opbutj Clerk

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ORDER TO ADMIT
THE DEPOSITION OF
RHONDA JONES

LONNIE PAULOS and ADVANCED
ORTHOPEDICS and SPORTS
MEDICINE LLC, a Utah Corporation,
Plaintiff,

Civil No: 060903698

vs.
ALL MY SONS MOVING AND
STORAGE, a business entity, JOHN DOE,
doing business as All My Sons Moving and
Storage, and S & B STORAGE, a business
entity, and JOHN SIDDOWAY, doing
business as S & B Storage, and JOHN
DOES 1-10,

Judge: Stephen Henroid

Defendants.
Based upon the Motion to Admit the Deposition of Rhonda Jones and Memorandum in
Support Thereof of the Plaintiff, and good cause appearing therefore IT IS HEREBY

ORDERED, DECREED, AND ADJUDGED AS FOLLOWS:

A i ^-n

1.

That the Deposition of Rhonda Jones on April 30, 2007 shall be admitted into

evidence to be used during the trial scheduled for November 6-8, 2007 in the above-entitled
matter.

DATED this / * / d a y of October, 2007.
BY THE COURT:

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER TO ADMIT THE
DEPOSITION OF RHONDA JONES was mailed, postage prepaid, this "2-? day of
OCTOBER, 2007, to:
Stephen D. Spencer
DAY SHELL & LILJENQUIST
45 East Vine Street
Murray, Utah 84107
Randy Ludlow
Attorney at Law
185 South State Street, Suite 208
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
/

